Ebola, Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy by Gatter, Robert




Ebola, Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy
Robert Gatter
Saint Louis University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gatter, Robert, Ebola, Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy (April 23, 2015). University of Miami Business Law Review, Vol. 23, No.
3, 2015.




Ebola, Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy 
Robert Gatter* 
The CDC’s Interim Guidance for Monitoring and Movements of 
Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure is deeply flawed 
because it disregards the science of Ebola transmission. It 
recommends that officials quarantine individuals exposed to the 
virus but who do not have any symptoms of illness, ignoring the 
fact that only those with Ebola symptoms can communicate the 
virus to others. Consequently, any quarantine order based on the 
Guidance is surely unconstitutional and illegal under most 
states’ public health statutes—as exemplified by the State of 
Maine’s failed petition to quarantine Nurse Kaci Hickox in 
October 2014. This article examines the Guidance and events 
surrounding its creation to explore why the CDC issued 
quarantine recommendations that lack scientific foundation. It 
also catalogues the costs of doing so, concluding that the 
Guidance undermines rather than serves population health. 
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My approach is to figure out what works, get it done and 
base it all on data. 
Tom Frieden, MD, M.P.H.  
Director, CDC 
INTRODUCTION 
Remember Kaci Hickox? She is the nurse who volunteered to treat 
Ebola patients in a disease-stricken West African nation, and then 
dominated the news when she fought against efforts by two states to 
quarantine1 her after she returned home symptom-free. 
You might remember how she stood up to New Jersey Governor 
Chris Christie, who had mandated the quarantine of everyone who 
treated Ebola patients, even those who could not transmit Ebola to others 
because they did not have any symptoms of the disease.2 Christie applied 
this mandate to Hickox when she returned to the U.S. through Newark 
Liberty International Airport.3 When New Jersey’s policy was criticized 
on the grounds that it ignored the science of Ebola transmission, Christie 
claimed he was acting “out of an abundance of caution.”4 Hickox, 
sounding more like a seasoned politico than a nurse, quipped that the 
governor seemed to be acting “out of an abundance of politics.”5 
Almost certainly, you would recognize two famous photos of her. 
One is a quarantine-selfie taken from a tent erected in a parking lot of the 
Newark hospital where she was being held against her will.6 In the 
                                                                                                             
1 Throughout this article, I use the word “quarantine” to include both the complete 
separation of one exposed to Ebola from those who have not been exposed (e.g., the kind 
of quarantine imposed by New Jersey on Kaci Hickox) and the near-complete separation 
of one exposed to Ebola from those who have not been exposed, which allows the person 
exposed to be with others so long as she is not within three feet of any non-exposed 
person (e.g., the kind of quarantine that Maine sought to impose on Kaci Hickox). 
2 Leslie Savan, Nurse Kaci Hickox Takes on Bully Governors Christie, Cuomo and 
LePage, THE NATION (Oct. 29, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/186681/
nurse-kaci-hickox-takes-bully-governors-christie-cuomo-and-lepage#. 
3 Anemona Hartocollis & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Tested Negative, Nurse Criticizes 
Her Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2014, at A1. 
4 Susan Cornwall, Maine Nurse Sees Ebola Quarantines as ‘Abundance of Politics’, 
REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/02/us-health-
ebola-usa-idUSKBN0IM0PR20141102. 
5 Id. 
6 See Frank Rosario & Joe Tacopino, Ebola Nurse’s Quarantine Hell, N.Y. POST (Oct. 
27, 2014, 1:27 AM), available at http://nypost.com/2014/10/27/ebola-nurse-gets-prison-
treatment-in-quarantine-hell/. 
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photo, Hickox is wearing a patient’s gown, and we see that the Spartan 
shelter behind her is a makeshift hospital room.7 The second photo was 
taken a week or so later after Nurse Hickox had returned to her home in 
Fort Kent, Maine. In it, she is riding a bike in front of her house, 
indicating that she would not quarantine herself voluntarily despite a 
request by Maine health officials that she do so for another two weeks 
until the incubation period for the Ebola virus expired.8 
You might even remember that, following this defiant bike ride, the 
State of Maine petitioned a court for a quarantine order against Hickox.9 
The Court rejected the petition as unnecessary to safeguard the public’s 
health because Hickox was symptom-free, and only those with Ebola 
symptoms pose a risk of transmission.10 
Unnoticed or forgotten during this time was the Interim U.S. 
Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola 
Virus Exposure (the “Guidance”).11 It is authored by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the most authoritative public 
health agency in the country, if not the world. The CDC released the 
Guidance publically on October 29, 2014,12 the day before the State of 
Maine filed its petition for a quarantine order.13 
The Guidance recommends that state and local health agencies 
monitor and effectively quarantine even asymptomatic individuals, who, 
like Hickox, were exposed directly to the Ebola virus while in countries 
where the disease is widespread and while wearing appropriate 
protective equipment.14 
Maine’s health officials and lawyers attached the Guidance to the 
State’s petition.15 The petition correctly assessed that the Guidance 
placed Nurse Hickox in the category of having “some risk” of becoming 
                                                                                                             
7 See id. 
8 Nurse Defies Ebola Quarantine in Maine, Rides Bike, CBS NEWS (Oct. 30, 2014, 
1:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-nurse-kaci-hickox-defies-quarantine-in-
maine-goes-on-bike-ride/. 
9 See Verified Petition for Public Health Order, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. 2014-36 (Me. 
Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Petition], http://courts.maine.gov/news_reference/
high_profile/hickox.shtml. 
10 Order Pending Hearing at 3, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. 2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct. Oct. 
31, 2014) [hereinafter Order Pending Hearing], http://courts.maine.gov/news_reference/
high_profile/hickox.shtml. 
11 See CDC, INTERIM U.S. GUIDANCE FOR MONITORING AND MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
WITH POTENTIAL EBOLA VIRUS EXPOSURE (December 24, 2014) [hereinafter GUIDANCE]. 
The Guidance has been updated and amended by CDC since its initial publication. 
12 See id. 
13 See Petition, supra note 9. 
14 See GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 9 (referencing table addressing “some risk” 
category and “asymptomatic” clinical criteria). 
15 See Petition, supra note 9, Exhibit A. 
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ill with Ebola herself,16 and it sought an order that was based nearly 
word-for-word on the relevant recommendations of the Guidance.17 
So how could a court reject Maine’s petition? After all, it was based 
not only on the recommendation of the State’s chief health officer, but 
also on the express recommendations of the nation’s leading public 
health agency. How can a state judge, without any public health 
expertise, rule that a quarantine order grounded squarely on the 
recommendations of the CDC was not necessary to protect the public 
against the spread of Ebola? 
The answer is as shocking as it is simple. The recommendations in 
the CDC’s Guidance lack a basis in the science of Ebola transmission. 
Nobody can transmit Ebola to another person unless and until symptoms 
of the disease appear.18 The CDC, itself, says so. According to the 
agency’s educational materials for the public, an individual “can only get 
Ebola from [t]ouching the blood or body fluids of a person who is sick 
with or has died from Ebola.”19 So, even if we knew that an individual 
was infected with Ebola, that person would not pose any risk of 
transmission to anyone until after the virus had incubated fully and after 
the person began experiencing symptoms of the illness. Given this fact, 
quarantining someone who, like Hickox, does not display any symptoms 
of illness does not serve a public health purpose; instead, it unnecessarily 
separates from others a person who poses no health risk to the 
community, no matter how likely it is that such a person develops 
symptoms in the future. 
Accordingly, the Guidance’s recommendation to severely restrict an 
asymptomatic person’s contact with others is irrational because it 
contradicts the science. The CDC’s recommended restrictions, as applied 
to Nurse Hickox, so clearly lacked a foundation in the scientific facts 
about Ebola transmission that the Maine court had no choice but to 
disregard the CDC’s Guidance, and thus reject that portion of the State’s 
petition. 
The real question is why the CDC included these recommendations 
in the Guidance in the first place. It is unfathomable that the CDC’s 
experts were not aware that the agency’s recommended public health 
actions lacked a basis in the science of Ebola transmission. There must 
                                                                                                             
16 Id. ¶¶ 25-27. 
17 Compare id. ¶ 35 with GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 9 (showing recommended 
“public health action” for “asymptomatic” individuals in the “some risk” category). 
18 See Facts about Ebola in the U.S., CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/
infographic.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); see also Review of Human-to-Human 
Transmission of Ebola Virus, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/human-
transmission.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
19 See CDC, Facts about Ebola in the U.S., supra note 18. 
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be some other explanation, such as political pressure to stop the rising 
tide of fear, or perhaps the CDC silently suspected that this strain of the 
virus was more easily transmissible than earlier strains with which 
experts had experience. 
This article argues that, regardless of its reasons, the CDC may have 
fundamentally damaged its credibility, and that of health officials 
everywhere, by issuing recommendations in its Guidance that are 
unsupported by science. The price of doing so is the erosion of public 
health authority, which, ultimately, erodes population health. 
A. THE CDC’S GUIDANCE 
The real protagonists of this story are not Nurse Hickox or Governor 
Christie. Rather, they are the CDC and its Ebola Guidance. The 
Guidance creates a matrix of recommendations20 for public health 
officials about whether to monitor or restrict the movements of 
individuals exposed to the Ebola virus and, if so, to what degree.21 The 
matrix first divides individuals into four categories based on the 
likelihood that they will become sick with Ebola—high risk, some risk, 
low risk, and no identifiable risk.22 Again, these categories refer to the 
risk that the individual will become sick with Ebola, not the far more 
relevant risk that an individual will infect someone else. In other words, 
the matrix is flawed from the outset because it is based on the risk of 
illness, and not on the risk of transmission. 
The Guidance further sub-divides each of these risk categories based 
on whether an individual has symptoms of illness or is asymptomatic.23 
Thus, the Guidance creates eight categories and eight corresponding sets 
of recommendations with respect to monitoring or restricting the 
movements of individuals. For example, there are recommendations for 
those who are deemed to be at “high risk” for becoming sick with Ebola 
and who also have certain clinical symptoms; another set for those who 
are deemed to be at “high risk” for becoming sick with Ebola but who 
are asymptomatic; another set for those who are deemed to be at “some 
                                                                                                             
20 The Guidance is exactly that—guidance. It is a recommendation or a statement of 
policy that is issued by the CDC, as a federal agency. As such, it is exempt from even 
informal, notice-and-comment rule-making procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2014). 
Consequently, the Guidance does not have the force of law. See e.g., Prof’ls and Patients 
for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1995). 
21 See GUIDANCE, supra note 11. 
22 Id. at 9-12. 
23 Id. 
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risk” and have certain clinical symptoms; and still another for those who 
are deemed to be at “some risk,” but who are symptom-free, and so on.24 
The monitoring recommendations that correspond with each 
category range from no monitoring to active monitoring (where public 
health authorities regularly inquire about the individual’s temperature 
and other clinical symptoms) to direct active monitoring (where public 
health officials directly observe the individual and determine what, if 
any, clinical symptoms exist).25 The Guidance recommends direct active 
monitoring for all asymptomatic individuals in the “high risk” and “some 
risk” categories.26 “High risk” individuals include those who have had 
direct contact with the blood or bodily fluids of someone sick with 
Ebola, those who have lived with a person sick with Ebola, and those 
who have handled the body of someone who died from Ebola.27 Those 
with “some risk” of contracting Ebola include individuals who, while in 
countries where Ebola is widespread, have had direct contact with 
someone sick with Ebola while wearing personal protective equipment, 
as well as those who have had prolonged contact with a person sick with 
Ebola in the patient’s home, in a health care facility, or in a community 
setting.28 The Guidance recommends only active monitoring for 
asymptomatic individuals in the “low risk” category, which includes 
those who have been in a country with widespread Ebola within the past 
twenty-one days, but who had no known exposures; those who have had 
brief direct contact (e.g., shaking hands) with a person with Ebola, while 
the person was in the early stage of the disease; those who have had brief 
proximity (e.g., briefly being in the same room) with a person with 
Ebola, while the person was symptomatic; those who come into direct 
contact with a person sick with Ebola, while wearing personal protective 
equipment while in countries without widespread Ebola; and those who 
have traveled on an aircraft with a person with Ebola, while the person 
was symptomatic.29 Finally, no monitoring at all is recommended for 
those who have had no known exposure and are experiencing no 
symptoms of any illness.30 
                                                                                                             
24 Id. 
25 See id. at 2 (distinguishing active and direct active monitoring). 
26 Id. at 9. 
27 Id. at 9. 
28 Id. at 10. 
29 Id. at 11 (recommending, as an exception, direct active monitoring for individuals 
who have traveled on an aircraft and sat within three feet of someone who was 
symptomatic with Ebola). 
30 Id. at 12. Of course, monitoring recommendations only apply to those who are 
asymptomatic because the purpose of monitoring is to determine if and when a person 
without symptoms of Ebola becomes symptomatic for the disease. Once a person has 
Ebola symptoms, monitoring gives way to isolation and treatment. 
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Central to this story, however, are recommendations in the Guidance 
for restricting the movements of asymptomatic individuals in the “high 
risk” and “some risk” categories, which are so substantial that they 
closely resemble a complete quarantine.31 They include: 
• [E]xclusion from long-distance commercial 
conveyances (aircraft, ship, train, bus) or local public 
conveyances (e.g., bus, subway); 
• Exclusion from public places (e.g., shopping 
centers, movie theaters), and congregate gatherings; 
• Exclusion from workplaces for the duration of a 
public health order, unless approved by the state or local 
health department (telework is permitted); 
• Non-congregate public activities while 
maintaining a 3-foot distance from others may be 
permitted (e.g., jogging in a park); . . .  
• Any travel will be coordinated with public 
health authorities to ensure uninterrupted direct active 
monitoring; 
• Federal public health travel restrictions (Do Not 
Board) may be implemented based on an assessment of 
the particular circumstance . . . .32 
No movement restrictions are recommended under the Guidance for 
either the “low risk” or “no risk” categories.33 
In short, the Guidance recommends that individuals in the “high 
risk” and “some risk” categories be restricted from traveling, working, 
going to public places, or otherwise coming within three feet of another 
person. The only thing separating such a person from someone who is 
“quarantined” appears to be that the “patient” may go for a walk or jog in 
a location so isolated as to not risk coming within three feet of someone 
else and may drive to that isolated jogging spot alone if public health 
officials are notified of the plan. In essence, this is house-arrest with 
limited solo-driving and solo-jogging privileges. 
                                                                                                             
31 The Guidance distinguishes between controlling movement and quarantining 
individuals by giving these actions separate definitions. See GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 
3. Oddly, the Guidance defines “quarantine” and then never uses that term outside of the 
definition section of the document. 
32 GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 9-10. 
33 Id. at 11-12. 
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These are the restrictions that the State of Maine sought to impose on 
Kaci Hickox based upon a straight-forward application of the 
Guidance.34 At the time, she fell into the “some risk” category because 
she had come into direct contact with several people sick with Ebola 
while she was in Sierra Leone (a country where Ebola was widespread), 
and while she was wearing personal protective equipment.35 Moreover, 
at the time of Maine’s petition, Nurse Hickox did not have any 
symptoms of Ebola, but she was still within the twenty-one day 
incubation period of the virus.36 Within the structure of the Guidance’s 
matrix, she fell into the category for asymptomatic individuals who have 
“some risk” of becoming sick with Ebola themselves. Correspondingly, 
the Guidance recommended that she be subject to direct active 
monitoring and that her movements be restricted such that she would not 
come within three feet of another person for the remainder of the 
incubation period. 
As described next, the restrictions on movements for asymptomatic 
individuals recommended by the Guidance do not have a basis in the 
science of Ebola transmission. Accordingly, they violate a fundamental 
principle of public health practice and public health law that actions 
taken to protect population health be based in scientific fact. 
B. THE SCIENCE OF EBOLA TRANSMISSION 
Ebola is a hemorrhagic fever virus, which means that it infects and 
overwhelms vascular cells, causing them to burst and bleed.37 By 
severely damaging the vascular system, the illness undermines the 
body’s ability to regulate itself or mount an effective immune response, 
resulting in multi-organ system failure and death.38 Ebola is a 
particularly lethal hemorrhagic fever, causing death in fifty to ninety 
percent of those it infects.39 
                                                                                                             
34 See Petition, supra note 9, ¶ 35. 
35 Id. ¶¶ 26-29. 
36 Id. ¶ 26. 
37 See Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers: Fact Sheet, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/
spb/mnpages/dispages/Fact_Sheets/Viral_Hemorrhagic_Fevers_Fact_Sheet.pdf; Nat’l 
Inst. of Health, Hemorrhagic Fevers, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/hemorrhagicfevers.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2015); Ruth Tam, This is How 
You Get Ebola, As Explained by Science, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 30, 2014, 8:24 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/know-enemy/; Meghana H. Raykar et al., Ebola 
Virus Disease, 3 PHARMTECHMEDICA 493, 493 (July-Aug. 2014). 
38 Raykar, supra note 37, at 493. 
39 See id. 
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The virus is not easily transmitted from one human to another. 
Unlike an influenza or cold virus, it is not airborne,40 meaning that it 
does not “hang in the air” for long periods of time, and so it cannot be 
breathed in by another person.41 Instead, it is only spread as a result of 
contact with the bodily fluids of one who is in the throes of the illness. 
The CDC says that Ebola is transmitted: 
through direct contact (through broken skin or mucous 
membranes in, for example, the eyes, nose, or mouth) 
with: 
• blood or body fluids (including but not limited 
to urine, saliva, sweat, feces, vomit, breast milk, and 
semen) of a person who is sick with Ebola 
• objects (like needles and syringes) that have 
been contaminated with the virus 
• infected fruit bats or primates (apes and 
monkeys) 
Ebola is not spread through the air, by water, or in 
general, by food.42 
These limited routes of communication explain why those infected with 
Ebola are health care workers who have cared for sick and dying Ebola 
patients in hospitals, or family members and others who have cared for 
sick and dying Ebola patients in their homes, or those who have prepared 
for burial the bodies of deceased Ebola victims.43 
Meanwhile, individuals exposed to the Ebola virus, but who do not 
yet have symptoms of the illness, have never transmitted the virus to 
others. Since 1976, when Ebola was first discovered in humans, there 
have been twenty-five reported outbreaks, including the 2014 epidemic, 
                                                                                                             
40 See Ebola Transmission, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/ (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2015). 
41 See What We Know about Transmission of the Ebola Virus Among Humans, WHO 
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/06-october-2014/en/; Tom 
Howell Jr., CDC Throws Cold Water on Talk of ‘Airborne’ Ebola Transmission, WASH. 
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/1/
cdc-dismisses-talk-airborne-ebola-transmission/. While there has been speculation about 
the possibility that the current strain of Ebola circulating in West Africa could mutate so 
as to become airborne, see e.g., Michael T. Osterholm, What We’re Afraid to Say About 
Ebola, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2014, at A31, there is no evidence that the current strain is 
airborne. 
42 Ebola Transmission, supra note 40. 
43 See id.; Tam, supra note 37, at 4. 
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which is the largest.44 From those outbreaks there have been 16,242 
confirmed cases of human Ebola infection,45 and that number could be 
closer to 25,000 once additional suspected and probable cases are 
confirmed.46 Not one of these cases has resulted from contact with a 
person who did not have symptoms of the illness. Not one. 
No wonder the CDC, in its public education materials, identifies 
“[t]ouching the blood or body fluids of a person who is sick with or has 
died from Ebola” as the “only” way to become infected with the virus.47 
An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, criticizing the 
policy of quarantining health care workers who treat Ebola patients in 
West Africa, put a finer point on the power of our experience with the 
virus to explain how it is transmitted. 
Health care professionals treating patients with this 
illness have learned that transmission arises from contact 
with bodily fluids of a person who is symptomatic—that 
is, has a fever, vomiting, diarrhea, and malaise. We have 
very strong reason to believe that transmission occurs 
when the viral load in bodily fluids is high, on the order 
of millions of virions per microliter. This recognition 
has led to the dictum that an asymptomatic person is not 
contagious; field experience in West Africa has shown 
that conclusion to be valid.48 
Ebola can incubate inside the body of a person it infects for as long 
as twenty-one days without the person experiencing even a fever,49 let 
alone the bleeding, vomiting, and diarrhea that poses a risk to others.50 
                                                                                                             
44 See A. Elisha & B. Adegboro, Ebola Virus Diseases, 15(3) AFR. J. CLN. & EXPER. 
MICROBIO. 117, 117-118 (2014). 
45 2,387 cases resulted from the first twenty-four outbreaks, which is just the sum of 
the confirmed cases reported by WHO for those previous cases. See id. Another 13,855 
confirmed cases have resulted from the current outbreak in three West African nations. 
2014 Ebola Outbreak in West African—Case Counts, CDC (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html [hereinafter 
Case Counts]. The sum of the confirmed case counts from the 2014 outbreak and those 
from the prior twenty-four outbreaks is 16,242. 
46 See Case Counts, supra note 45 (reporting 22,525 suspected, probable and 
confirmed cases). 
47 See CDC, Facts about Ebola in the U.S., supra note 18. 
48 Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029 
(2014) (emphasis added). 
49 Raykar et al., supra note 37, at 494 (Ebola incubation period is two to twenty-one 
days). 
50 Drazen et al, supra note 48, at 2029 (“[W]e now know that fever precedes the 
contagious stage, allowing workers who are unknowingly infected to identify themselves 
before they become a threat to their community. This understanding is based on more 
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That is why a person infected with—but asymptomatic for—Ebola is not 
infectious to others. In short, somewhere between 16,242 and 25,000 
Ebola cases over nearly forty years reveal, without exception, that one 
who is infected with the virus is not contagious until signs of sickness 
appear. 
Given these facts about Ebola transmission, the Guidance’s 
recommendation that health officials prohibit a person who does not have 
symptoms of the illness from coming within three feet of another person 
for the twenty-one day incubation period of the virus is plainly irrational. 
It guards against a form of transmission, the risk of which is so 
infinitesimally small as to be unprecedented in the decades-long human 
history of this virus. Moreover, in doing so, the Guidance ignores 
conclusions that can be drawn reliably from thousands—even tens of 
thousands—of cases. 
It should come as no surprise then that the state court judge in Maine 
summarily denied the petition seeking an order to quarantine Nurse 
Hickox, which was based on the scientifically unfounded 
recommendation in the CDC’s Guidance to separate from others 
individuals who are not contagious. As the next section explains, any 
public health official ordering the quarantine of an asymptomatic person 
exposed to Ebola is almost surely violating state quarantine law and is 
certainly violating the federal Constitution. 
C. THE LAW 
Every state, as a vestige of its original sovereignty, retains its police 
power,51 which authorizes states to protect the health, safety, and welfare 
of its citizenry by, among other things, enacting quarantine laws.52 In 
fact, every state has enacted some form of quarantine law.53 As a 
condition of quarantining an individual, states’ laws typically require 
                                                                                                             
than clinical observation: the sensitive blood polymerase-chain-reaction (PCR) test for 
Ebola is often negative on the day when fever or other symptoms begin and only 
becomes reliably positive 2 to 3 days after symptom onset.”). 
51 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“the police power [is] a 
power which the State did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union under 
the Constitution”). 
52 See id. (explaining that the police power includes the authority of a state to regulate 
for the purpose of protecting the public health and safety, and it includes the power to 
enact quarantine laws). 
53 See TRUST FOR AM. HEALTH, STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION LAWS (2004), 
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror04/Quarantine.pdf; see also MODEL STATE 
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/
MSEHPA.pdf. 
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public health officials to obtain a court order authorizing such action.54 
Moreover, states’ laws commonly prohibit a court from issuing a 
quarantine order unless the state puts forth evidence that the person who 
would be subject to the order poses a health risk to the population and 
that it is necessary to quarantine that person in order to protect the public 
from this risk.55 
By recommending that state and local health officials quarantine 
individuals exposed to Ebola but who show no signs of illness, the 
Guidance is setting up health officials for failure under many states’ 
laws. As established above, a person exposed to Ebola who has no 
symptoms of the disease cannot infect others with the virus, not even if 
we somehow knew that the person was incubating the virus. 
Consequently, asymptomatic individuals do not “pose a risk” of 
spreading Ebola to others, and, therefore, it is not “necessary” to 
quarantine those individuals in order to protect the public’s health. 
Because the burden falls on the state to establish the existence of a “risk” 
of contagion as well as the “necessity” of quarantine, health officials 
simply cannot prevail when pursuing an order to quarantine an 
asymptomatic person exposed to Ebola. 
This is exactly why a judge in Maine denied the State’s petition to 
quarantine Kaci Hickox. Under Maine law, a court may not issue a 
quarantine order unless, “based upon clear and convincing evidence, the 
court finds that a public health threat exists . . . ,” and, even then, the 
court may order only “the least restrictive measures necessary to 
effectively protect the public health.”56 In Hickox’s case, health officials 
admitted in the petition that “[i]ndividuals infected with Ebola Virus 
Disease who are not showing symptoms are not yet infectious,”57 and 
that Nurse Hickox showed no symptoms.58 Given Maine law and these 
facts, the Court had no choice but to reject the portion of the petition 
seeking to prohibit Nurse Hickox from coming within three feet of 
anyone else for the remainder of the twenty-one day incubation period. 
The judge wrote: “According to the information presented to the court, 
Respondent [Hickox] currently does not show any symptoms of Ebola 
                                                                                                             
54 See id.; see TRUST FOR AM. HEALTH, supra note 53, at 14. In some states, health 
officials must obtain an initial temporary quarantine order from a court, which can be 
obtained on an ex parte basis, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 250-2 (2014), while in other 
states, health officials may act initially on their own authority to quarantine an individual 
temporarily so long as officials pursue a court order in support of the quarantine within a 
short period of time, e.g., MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 605. 
55 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 605; TRUST FOR AM. HEALTH, 
supra note 53. 
56 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 812-1 (2014). 
57 Petition, supra note 9, ¶ 14. 
58 See id. ¶ 27. 
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and is therefore not infectious.”59 Consequently, the court held that “[t]he 
State has not met its burden at this time to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that limiting Respondent’s movements to the degree requested 
is ‘necessary to protect other individuals from the dangers of 
infection’ . . . .”60 
Even if health officials or a court were to issue an order under a 
state’s law prohibiting an asymptomatic individual from coming within 
three feet of another person, it would almost certainly be set aside as 
violating the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the federal 
Constitution. The clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any 
person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law . . . .”61 The Supreme 
Court of the United States has interpreted this language to protect 
individuals from deprivations of liberty by a state where such state action 
lacks sufficient substantive justification; the purpose is to prevent 
governments from acting arbitrarily.62 In particular, when state action 
deprives someone of a “fundamental liberty interest,” the state carries a 
burden to prove that its action is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.”63 Fundamental liberty interests are those that are “‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ . . . and ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would 
exist if they were sacrificed,’”64 and they include freedom from physical 
restraint or confinement65 for the purpose of protecting the public’s 
health.66 
As applied here, there is no doubt that prohibiting an asymptomatic 
individual from traveling, working, being in public places, or otherwise 
coming within three feet of another person imposes a substantial physical 
restraint on that individual to the point of constituting confinement. In 
other words, such a prohibition deprives the individual of a fundamental 
liberty interest. Thus, the state would be required to prove that such a 
                                                                                                             
59 Order Pending Hearing, supra note 10, at 3. 
60 Id. 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
62 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process 
is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”). 
63 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). 
64 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
65 See id. at 719; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (addressing 
claims of an insanity aquitee to be discharged from confinement, the Court said 
“[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). 
66 See e.g., Best v. St. Vincent Hosp., No. 03-0365, 2003 WL 21518829 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (applying strict scrutiny to New York City’s action to isolate a tuberculosis patient 
until he completed treatment), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded in part sub nom 
Best v. Bellvue Hosp., 115 Fed. Appx. 459 (2d. Cir. 2004). 
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physical restraint is narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling 
interest in protecting the public from the spread of Ebola. A quarantine 
order is not “narrowly tailored” to the state’s interest if there exists a less 
restrictive alternative that will also serve the state’s interest in preventing 
the spread of an infectious disease.67 Where the government’s interest is 
in protecting the public from becoming infected with Ebola by a person 
who has been exposed to the virus but who does not have any symptoms 
of illness, there are far less restrictive alternatives to a near-absolute 
quarantine. An asymptomatic person is not infectious to others, so the 
state’s interest is served by regularly monitoring to determine whether 
and, if so, when the person develops symptoms of illness, which would 
indicate that the individual had become infectious and must be isolated 
from others.68 Because the public’s health can be protected from the 
spread of Ebola in the case of an asymptomatic person by court-ordered 
monitoring, which is much less restrictive than a near-absolute 
quarantine, a federal court would surely rule that quarantining an 
asymptomatic person is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest 
in preventing the spread of this virus. Consequently, the order would be 
set aside as unconstitutional. 
In the end, both the science and the law quite clearly indicate just 
how poorly conceived the movement restrictions recommended in the 
Guidance really are. They cannot be justified by the science of Ebola 
transmission, and so they cannot be enforced by law. The CDC has 
highly skilled scientists who specialize in infectious diseases, and it has 
many highly skilled lawyers. It is extraordinarily unlikely, then, that the 
agency was not aware of the substantial shortcomings of the Guidance 
                                                                                                             
67 See id. at *7-8 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)) (“Even [when] 
the governmental purpose [is] legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued 
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more 
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of 
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.”). 
68 In making the determination that quarantine is not narrowly tailored to the state’s 
interest in preventing the spread of Ebola, a federal court is likely to defer to the 
judgments of health officials only if they are based on current medical knowledge 
about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) 
the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the 
severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) 
the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause 
varying degrees of harm. 
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 274 (1987). Although Arline 
concerned a claim of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court’s 
logic about the standard of review it would apply to medical findings concerning the 
transmission of contagious diseases is applicable in the realm of substantive due process. 
See Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. REV. 
933, 937-42 (1989). 
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when applied to asymptomatic individuals who have been exposed to 
Ebola. What then explains the CDC’s decision to include in its Guidance 
that those individuals be subject to such extreme restrictions on their 
movements? That question is addressed in the next section. 
D. THE GUIDANCE IN CONTEXT 
The short and recent history of Ebola in America is one of mounting 
fear and finger-pointing at the CDC. It began in September 2014, when 
Thomas Eric Duncan, a Liberian visiting family in Dallas, Texas, was 
diagnosed with Ebola.69 It peaked a month later when a physician, Craig 
Spencer, who had treated Ebola patients in West Africa was admitted to 
a New York City hospital with the disease after having spent the 
previous week out among New Yorkers eating in restaurants, bowling, 
and riding the subway.70 In between, two nurses contracted Ebola as a 
result of caring for Duncan in a Dallas hospital, despite efforts to follow 
CDC protocol.71 Moreover, one of the nurses traveled on a commercial 
flight while she had a low-grade fever indicating the onset of Ebola 
symptoms, and the CDC did not prohibit her from doing so even after the 
nurse notified the CDC of her fever.72 Each of these events belied 
statements from CDC Director Tom Frieden that the U.S. was prepared 
to “stop Ebola in its tracks” when it entered the country.73 Consequently, 
the CDC and its director came under fire for its missteps and perceived 
failure to protect Americans adequately.74 
The CDC issued its Guidance in the heat of these events and 
criticism. Accordingly, we cannot fully appreciate the rationale for the 
seemingly unscientific recommendations the Guidance makes without 
analyzing them in this context. Doing so allows for an educated guess 
that the CDC recommended the quarantine of non-infectious individuals 
both because it could not rule out the theoretical possibility that an 
asymptomatic person incubating Ebola could infect another person and, 
more importantly, because the agency could not take the political 
                                                                                                             
69 Sydney Lupkin, Ebola in America: Timeline of the Deadly Virus, ABC NEWS (Nov. 
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73 Tom Frieden, Why U.S. Can Stop Ebola in its Tracks, CNN (Oct. 2, 2014, 5:43 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/02/opinion/frieden-ebola-first-patient/. 
74 See, e.g., Jennifer Haberkorn & Lauren French, CDC Director in Hot Zone at Ebola 
Hill Hearing, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/
10/hearing-will-have-public-health-officials-grilled-on-ebola-111943.html. 
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embarrassment of yet another mistake. All of this is described in greater 
detail in this section, which proceeds chronologically through the key 
events. 
1. Thomas Eric Duncan 
Thomas Eric Duncan arrived in the U.S. on September 20, 2014, to 
reunite with and marry the mother of his 16-year-old son.75 Shortly 
before leaving Liberia, he had helped transport a sick, pregnant woman 
to and from a local hospital.76 At one point, he carried her from his car to 
her house.77 She died from Ebola the next morning, but it is unclear 
whether Duncan understood what she had died from when he left for the 
U.S. four days later.78 He was screened by officials before boarding his 
international flight.79 At the time, his temperature was normal.80 He also 
reported, errantly, that he had not had any recent contact with an Ebola 
victim.81 
On September 25, Duncan went to Texas Presbyterian Hospital in 
Dallas, where he told a nurse that he had a fever and that he had recently 
traveled to the U.S. from Liberia.82 Based on this information alone, his 
treating physician should have recognized the possibility of an Ebola 
infection and isolated him. Instead, the physician at the hospital sent him 
home with some antibiotics.83 Duncan’s symptoms progressed, and he 
returned to the hospital much sicker several days later.84 He was then 
admitted and isolated, and the diagnosis of Ebola was first made on 
September 28.85 On October 8, Duncan died.86 
When the news reported that Ebola had entered the U.S. and that the 
country’s first Ebola patient was being treated in a Dallas hospital, Dr. 
Tom Frieden held a press conference where he famously said, “We will 
                                                                                                             
75 Anna Almendrala, What We Know About Thomas Eric Duncan, The First Ebola 











84 Alana Horowitz et al., Thomas Eric Duncan Dead; Dallas Ebola Patient Had Been 
Critically Ill, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2014, 11:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/10/08/thomas-eric-duncan-dead-ebola-dallas_n_5952502.html. 
85 Almendrala, supra note 75. 
86 Horowitz, supra note 84. 
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stop it in its tracks, because we’ve got infection control in hospitals and 
public health that tracks and isolates people if they get symptoms.”87 As 
events unfolded, however, it became apparent that infection control in 
the hospital treating Duncan was not working as it should. 
2. Nurses Pham and Vinson 
Nina Pham and Amber Vinson are nurses at the hospital that treated 
Thomas Eric Duncan.88 Both cared for him while he was in the throes of 
the illness, changing his sheets, washing him, and mopping his floors.89 
They each wore protective gear including gloves, suits, and masks, and 
they used a buddy system both to put on and take off their equipment 
each shift.90 Neither can identify a time when they breached CDC 
protocol for the use of personal protective equipment by health care 
workers treating Ebola patients.91 At most, they noted that the hospital 
did not initially have the head gear and positive-pressure suits used by 
caretakers at Emory University.92 
Despite their best efforts to follow then-current CDC protocol, both 
Nurse Pham and Nurse Vinson became infected with Ebola. Nurse Pham 
was the first to develop a fever on October 11, and she went straight to 
the hospital after notifying public health officials.93 Nurse Vinson 
entered the hospital three days later, also with a fever.94 Each was later 
transferred to other facilities more experienced in the care of Ebola 
patients. Pham went to the National Institutes of Health in Maryland, and 
Vinson went to Emory University Hospital.95 Both were nursed through 
their illnesses, survived, and were discharged.96 
The CDC was criticized intensely as soon as the nurses were 
diagnosed with Ebola.97 Dr. Frieden had assured America that hospitals 
were prepared to prevent the spread of Ebola, and yet two nurses were 
                                                                                                             
87 Mikayla Bouchard, CDC Head Frieden on Ebola in America: ‘We Will Stop It In Its 
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infected. Moreover, in what could be viewed as an admission that the 
agency’s Ebola infection-control policies and procedures were 
insufficient, the CDC issued a new protocol instructing health care 
workers how to best protect themselves from infection when caring for 
Ebola patients, which called for enhanced forms of personal protective 
equipment.98 
To make matters worse, the CDC did not stop Nurse Vinson from 
boarding a commercial flight even after she informed the agency that she 
had a low-grade fever a day after Nurse Pham had been hospitalized with 
then-suspected Ebola.99 Later, CDC officials admitted that the agency 
should have instructed Vinson not to board the plane when she reported a 
slight fever.100 As result of this blunder, the CDC contacted each of the 
more than 130 passengers on that flight to determine which of them, if 
any, required active monitoring.101 All of this happened at a time when 
health officials were already monitoring more than 100 other Americans 
who had treated, lived with, or otherwise come into contact with Thomas 
Eric Duncan or any other U.S. victim of Ebola.102 
At this point, Congress, if not the public, lost confidence in the 
CDC’s ability to protect Americans. Some Republican legislators called 
for Dr. Frieden’s resignation as Director of the CDC.103 The Speaker of 
the House urged the Obama Administration to restrict air travel to the 
U.S. from the West African nations where Ebola was widespread.104 One 
Republican Senator announced that he would bypass the Administration 
and introduce a bill to ban the issuance of visas to foreign nationals from 
any of those West African nations.105 Even Democrats were highly 
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critical. The ranking Democrat on a House subcommittee before which 
Dr. Frieden testified said, “It would be an understatement to say that the 
response to the first U.S.-based patient with Ebola has been mismanaged, 
causing risk to scores of additional people.”106 
3. Dr. Craig Spencer and Nurse Kaci Hickox 
Things went from bad to worse on October 23, 2014, when it was 
reported that a physician, Craig Spencer, who had treated Ebola patients 
in West Africa, was admitted to Bellevue Hospital in New York City 
after reporting to health officials that he had developed a fever and 
gastrointestinal symptoms.107 Dr. Spencer had returned to his home in 
New York from Guinea six days earlier.108 During those six days, he had 
not been monitored by health officials109; rather, he had been taking his 
own temperature twice a day and watching for any sign of a fever, which 
was consistent with the instructions he had been given by Doctors 
Without Borders—the medical relief organization through which he had 
volunteered to treat Ebola patients in Guinea.110 
Alarming to many, however, was that Dr. Spencer, while infected 
with Ebola, had been out in public in New York City during those six 
days before he experienced symptoms of the illness.111 
[H]e traveled to Manhattan’s Highline Park and a 
popular restaurant called The Meatball Shop on 
Tuesday. The next day, he took a 3-mile run along 
Riverside Park and traveled on the subway to Brooklyn, 
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where he went bowling. He was fatigued, but had no 
fever, officials said.112 
On October 24, the day after Craig Spencer entered the hospital with 
Ebola and in direct response to the public fear his story triggered, several 
states took matters into their own hands. Rather than follow the CDC’s 
lead of permitting travelers returning home from West Africa to go out in 
public even if they had had contact with someone sick with Ebola, New 
Jersey, New York, and Illinois instituted policies to quarantine all such 
travelers—regardless of symptoms—until the twenty-one day incubation 
period for Ebola had elapsed for each of them.113 Governors Christie and 
Cuomo defended their tough new policies, saying “[w]e are no longer 
relying on C.D.C. standards” because a “voluntary Ebola quarantine is 
not enough.”114 
Nurse Hickox landed at Newark Liberty International Airport the 
very day after New Jersey instituted its new policy of mandatory 
quarantine.115 She became the first person subjected to mandatory 
quarantine of travelers from an Ebola-ridden country.116 It triggered a 
stand-off between the Obama Administration, which rebuked states that 
instituted mandatory quarantine for overreacting and potentially 
undermining Ebola relief efforts, and the governors of those states, who 
raised concerns that the federal government’s response to Ebola was 
insufficient to protect the public’s health.117 As described in the 
introduction to this article, New Jersey officials released Hickox from 
her quarantine two days later on October 27, after she agreed to travel by 
private means directly to her home state of Maine, where, as we know, 
she then fought the efforts of that state to quarantine her. 
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4. Theoretical Risks of Transmission 
During this same timeline, news outlets reported that scientists had 
not ruled out the possibility that Ebola is transmissible through coughing 
and sneezing.118 Nor could they rule out the possibility that 
asymptomatic individuals might shed some virus cells before developing 
significant symptoms.119 These reports were based on statements from 
scientists that laboratory data had not eliminated the theoretical risk of 
Ebola transmission through a cough or sneeze droplet or the theoretical 
risk that an asymptomatic person with a non-zero viral load could 
transmit Ebola to another person. Moreover, there is at least one 
coincidence suggesting that the CDC felt compelled to account for these 
statements about theoretical risks from scientists. The agency, at about 
the same time that it issued its Guidance, also updated its web-based 
FAQs concerning Ebola transmission via coughing or sneezing.120 The 
new version clarified that “[t]here is no evidence indicating that Ebola 
virus is spread by coughing or sneezing,”121 which is different from 
saying definitively that the virus cannot be spread that way. 
All of this together describes the context in which the CDC made its 
recommendation in the Guidance to severely restrict the movements of 
asymptomatic individuals like Nurse Hickox. The agency acted in the 
midst of fear that, without mandatory quarantine, health care workers 
incubating Ebola, like Craig Spencer, would be out in public and 
somehow spread the virus. It acted in the midst of fear that Kaci Hickox 
might be another Craig Spencer. Furthermore, it issued the Guidance at a 
time when public attention was focusing on theoretical rather than actual 
risks, and when confidence in the CDC was at a low point given the 
mistakes and policy shifts it had made during the crisis. 
Viewed from this perspective, it seems plausible that the CDC would 
issue a policy to account for theoretical risks that science had yet to rule-
out, and not simply the known risks that science and field experience 
confirmed as true. With its credibility substantially damaged by its 
earlier blunders and mistaken predictions, the agency might have 
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rationalized that it was necessary to accommodate public fear by 
recommending severe “movement restrictions” for asymptomatic 
individuals with at least “some risk” of developing Ebola. The CDC may 
have convinced itself that this would prevent another embarrassment and 
thereby preserve its ability to set policy throughout the crisis. 
Of course, this is merely an educated guess based on information that 
is publically available. Perhaps hardball politics was going on behind 
closed doors, which has yet to come to light. In any case, the story of the 
CDC’s Guidance, and of the events that preceded it, is a cautionary tale 
of how even the most authoritative public health agency can go wrong 
when it makes policy divorced from science. It demonstrates how expert 
administrators with impeccable credentials and the best of intentions can 
make public health policy that accommodates public fear at the expense 
of science. The next and final section of this article examines the price 
we pay when that happens. 
E. THE MANY COSTS OF ACCOMMODATING FEAR IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH POLICY 
A fundamental principle of public health practice is that policy must 
be grounded in science. It is embedded in Dr. Frieden’s practice, 
described in the epigraph of this article, to “base it all on data.”122 
Regardless of the underlying reason (or rationalization), the CDC’s 
recommendation in its Guidance that asymptomatic individuals exposed 
to Ebola patients while in West Africa be prohibited from coming within 
three feet of another person for the  twenty-one day incubation period of 
the virus breached this core principle. As demonstrated by almost forty 
years of experience, encompassing twenty-five Ebola outbreaks, and 
somewhere between 16,000 and 25,000 human cases, asymptomatic 
individuals incubating Ebola do not pose a risk of transmission to 
others.123 Consequently, subjecting them to a near-absolute quarantine 
does not serve a public health purpose. Instead, it accommodates and 
exacerbates public fear, deprives some individuals of their right to move 
about freely, and sets a dangerous example for ignoring science. Each of 
these comes at a high cost, and some of those costs are apparent from our 
recent experience with Ebola. 
As others have noted, one cost of unnecessary restrictions on the 
liberty of those who travel to West Africa to care for Ebola patients is 
                                                                                                             
122 Jon Schuppe, CDC Chief Tom Frieden Confronts Ebola Crisis Cool and Collected, 
NBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/
cdc-chief-tom-frieden-confronts-ebola-crisis-cool-collected-n175351. 
123 See supra text accompanying notes 44–46. 
2015] EBOLA, QUARANTINE, AND FLAWED CDC POLICY 23 
 
that such a policy discourages health care workers from volunteering to 
provide such treatment.124 The medical relief organization, Doctors 
Without Borders, for which both Craig Spencer and Kaci Hickox 
volunteered, reported in late October 2014 that it had already seen the 
“chilling effect” that a threat of quarantine and similar restrictions were 
having on its volunteers.125 Anxiety and confusion among workers over 
quarantine laws caused the organization to consider shortening stays in 
West Africa so as to accommodate the twenty-one days a worker might 
need to remain away from family and co-workers after returning 
home.126 
Imposing additional burdens on individuals who would otherwise 
fight the spread of Ebola at its source is not only unfair to health care 
workers volunteering their services at great personal risk, but it also 
increases the risk that the disease spreads. Like a wildfire, an infectious 
disease will spread if not contained.127 Thus, the best way to protect the 
population of the U.S. against Ebola is to contain it and stop it in West 
Africa. That, of course, requires willing volunteer health care workers to 
travel abroad to take up the fight. 
Additionally, when the CDC accommodates public fear by 
recommending a near-absolute quarantine of health care workers 
returning from West Africa, it creates cover for others to do the same. 
The Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
announced a policy in late October to quarantine all military personnel 
for twenty-one days when they return from service in any of the three 
West African nations where Ebola was widespread.128 This tremendous 
waste of financial and military resources was designed to comfort 
military personnel and their families against the fear that somehow an 
asymptomatic soldier might infect a loved one with Ebola back home.129 
Once the precedent is set for accommodating irrational public fear 
over the transmission of Ebola from asymptomatic individuals, it is 
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difficult to contain. It imposes a social, if not a legal, obligation on health 
care workers to quarantine themselves rather than risk being perceived as 
irresponsible.130 Likewise, it puts political pressure on state politicians to 
out-do each other in the name of soothing public fear and comforting 
their constituents.  As one newspaper headline put it, “Is Your State 
Quarantining Ebola Doctors?”131 The accompanying article stated that 
“[s]everal governors in tough reelection fights are rejecting CDC’s Ebola 
Guidelines in favor of more draconian rules.”132 
Discrimination against those associated with Ebola is an even uglier 
cost to accommodating irrational public fear about transmission of the 
disease. Here are just a few examples of Ebola discrimination in the U.S. 
Officials in several states excluded teachers and students from 
classrooms merely because they or someone they live with traveled to 
West Africa.133 Health care workers who had treated Ebola patients in 
Atlanta, New York, and Dallas lost moonlighting jobs, were denied 
service in local businesses, and had their children turned away from day 
care for fear that they posed a danger.134 School-aged brothers from 
Senegal, living in the U.S., were beaten by classmates yelling “Ebola.”135 
Certainly, there would be cases of discrimination regardless of whether 
the CDC accommodated public fear through its Guidance, but we must 
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assume that cases of discrimination increase significantly when the 
nation’s leading public health authority suggests that there is reason to 
fear that we might catch Ebola even from those who do not appear to be 
sick. 
Finally, when the CDC, through the Guidance, ignores the facts 
about Ebola transmission, it erodes confidence in science, which makes 
the work of protecting the public’s health all the more difficult. Consider 
the latest measles outbreak in the U.S. From January 1 through April 3, 
2015, there were 159 cases of measles spanning eighteen states and the 
District of Columbia.136 The recent resurgence of measles in the U.S. is 
often blamed on parents who ignore the scientific facts about the risks 
and benefits of the measles vaccine.137 How can the CDC or any public 
health agency blatantly ignore the science of Ebola transmission, and 
then urge American parents to set aside their unfounded fear and trust the 
science behind the measles vaccine? 
In the face of both widespread fear over Ebola in the U.S. and the 
CDC’s damaged credibility following several early mistakes, it might 
have been a near impossible task for the agency to fend-off its critics and 
hold public health policy accountable strictly to the science of Ebola 
transmission. But that is the fight the CDC should have taken up. Instead, 
by issuing its deeply flawed Guidance, the agency ignored its bedrock 
responsibility and, as a result, undermined the public’s health. 
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